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Is The Intentional Killing Of An Unborn
Child Homicide? California's Law
To Punish The Willful Killing
Of A Fetus
The California Supreme Court's decision in Keeler v. Superior
Court precipitated a legislative battle to include a fetus as a hu-
man being within the homicide statutes. Penal Code section 187
had existed unchanged since 1872. No one anticipated that the
court would hold that a man who kills a fetus would not be con-
victable under its provision. The legislature has now cured this
defect, with a simple provision calling for the inclusion of a fetus,
not as a human being, but separately, as subject to being murdered.
On February 23, 1969, Teresa Keeler was delivered of a stillborn
baby girl. The cause of the infant's death was said to be "skull frac-
ture with consequent cerebral hemorraging."' Thus began a case in
which a man whom many would have considered a murderer escaped
trial for that crime. During its course the Supreme Court of California
inquired into the minds of the state's first legislature and received
guidance therefrom.2 It also marked the beginning of a legislative
battle to change a law which had existed in its pristine state for 98
years.3
Keeler v. Superior Court
Robert and Teresa Keeler were divorced in September of 1 968.
Unknown to Robert, Teresa was then pregnant with Ernest Vogt's
I Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 623 (1970), petition for rehearing
denied September 10, 1970.
2 Id. at 628.
1 CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 1st Ed. (1872) [Hereinafter cited as CAL. PEN. CODE OF1872].
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child. Robert heard this news at some time subsequent to the divorce,
and his suspicions were confirmed on the fatal date, when he saw
Teresa's obvious condition for the first time. This discovery so in-
censed him that he exclaimed, "I'm going to stomp it out of you."4
He then pushed Teresa, hit her in the face several times and shoved his
knee into her midriff. Later that day Teresa's baby was delivered by
Caesarian section. The pathologist's opinion was that the fractured
skull causing death could have been inflicted by force applied to the
abdomen.5
Keeler was arrested and an information was filed charging him with
murder, willful infliction of traumatic injury and assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury.6 The evidence was in
conflict as to the age of the fetus at the time of death, but there was
little question that the child could have lived had it been born with-
out injury.7
Keeler moved to set aside the information for lack of probable cause.'
Upon denial of his motion he sought, and was refused, a writ of pro-
hibition from the Third District Court of Appeal.9 He then brought
his appeal to the State's highest court. In an interesting and scholarly
opinion by Justice Mosk, the Court held by a five to two margin that a
fetus was not a human being within the meaning of Penal Code sec-
tion 187.10 Keeler could not be charged with murder since the victim of
the alleged crime was not capable of being its subject. To convict
Keeler of this crime would be to deprive him of due process of law,
since he could not have known,, even presumptively, that his actions
would constitute murder."
For Robert Keeler the decision was a momentous one. He escaped
trial for a capital crime. For students of the criminal law, it is per-
haps surprising that what seems an elementary question should require
resolution at this late date. For the California Legislature it was the
beginning of a short but determined effort to eliminate what at least
one legislator considered an anomaly in our criminal law.
4 2 Cal. 3d 619, 623 (1970).
• Id.
G Id. at 624. Keeler was charged with violations of Penal Code §§ 273d and
245, as well as with violation of Penal Code § 187. As of Oct. 1 1970, he was await-
ing trial on both lesser counts.
7 Id. Chances for its survival were estimated at from 75 to 96 percent.
Id.
9 Keeler v. Superior Court, 276 A.C.A. 324, 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1969). The
opinion by Judge Friedman concluded that a fetus was included within the murder
statute on the basis of the decision in People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621 (1947).
See pp. 177, 178 infra.
10 2 Cal. 3d 619, 623 (1970).
11 Id. at 639.
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Assembly Bill 816
The Keeler decision was filed on June 12, 1970.12 Shortly there-
after, Craig Biddle (R-Riverside), the California Assembly's Majority
Floor Leader, issued a press release indicating his disagreement with
the decision. 13  The release stated that Biddle felt the legislature had
already determined the question which the court refused to answer by
attaching the 20-week criterion to the Therapeutic Abortion Act, and
that further definition was not necessary.' 4  "To now suggest that the
killing of unborn children well beyond that stage of development is
not to be regarded as murder would be inconsistent, irrational and im-
moral. . ".."15 On June 24th Biddle acted. Assemblyman Don Mac-
Gillivray (R-Santa Barbara) relinquished sponsorship of Assembly Bill
816 to Biddle, who promptly offered amendments to the bill. The
amendments as passed at this initial stage provided that the bill would
amend sections 187 (murder) and 192 (manslaughter) of the Penal
Code to reflect that a fetus into or beyond the 20th week of uteroges-
tation is a human being within the meaning of the statute.1"
At this same time Biddle issued another press release explaining his
actions in the assembly.' 7  He stated that he wanted to clarify the
legislative intent with regard to murder of a fetus, as suggested by the
court in the Keeler decision, and that this was the way to do it.'
Biddle's original intent with his bill was simply to include a fetus in
or beyond the 20th week of uterogestation as a human being for
purposes of murder and manslaughter.'" During the process of the
bill through committee hearings and floor sessions of the assembly
and senate, however, several changes had to be made. The first was
to add exceptions to the bill to insure that it did not conflict with the
abortion statutes. 20  This led to further difficulty, since the language
Biddle included was taken from the pre-1967 abortion statute, 21 and
had been specifically declared unconstitutional in People v. Belous.22
At an Assembly Criminal Procedure Committee meeting on July 15th,
the discussion led to Biddle's decision to find better language for this
12 Id. at 619.
13 Press Release from the office of Assembly Majority Floor Leader W. Craig
Biddle, Room 2128, State Capitol, Sacramento, California 95814, June 15, 1970.
14 Id. at 2.
1' Id.16 A.B. 816, 1970 Regular Session, as amended June 24, 1970.
17 Press Release from the office of Assembly Majority Floor Leader W. Craig
Biddle, Room 2128, State Capitol, Sacramento, California 95814, June 24, 1970.
's Id. at 2.
19 A.B. 816, 1970 Regular Session, as amended June 24, 1970.
20 A.B. 816, 1970 Regular Session, as amended July 10, 1970.
21 CAL. PEN. CODE OF 1872, § 274, as amended by CAL. STATS. 1935, c. 528, § 1.
22 71 A.C. 996, 1002, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357 (1969).
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section, and to include an exception for the Therapeutic Abortion Act,
the criminal abortion law and the consented-to abortion law.23  The
language was not changed at this time, however. It is also interesting
to note that at this same hearing, Committee Chairman Frank Mur-
phy, Jr. (R-Santa Cruz), expressed his opinion that the bill should be
changed to include any fetus, not only those in or beyond the 20th
week. Biddle also felt he should make this suggested change.
The bill was amended in the assembly on July 17, 1970, and re-
turned to committee.24 It was accepted without further amendment,
and sent back to the floor with a "do pass" recommendation.25
Biddle's bill met unexpected opposition on the assembly floor. One
of the sections of the bill concerned an exception to the fetus murder
section, so that it would not conflict with Penal Code Section 275,
which covered abortion with the consent of the mother. 26  Some legis-
lators thought this exception should not be made. They felt an ex-
pectant woman should not have this power over the life of her incipi-
ent child, and argued against the bill on this basis. Assemblyman
Leo J. Ryan (D. South San Francisco) questioned the wisdom of widen-
ing the definition of "human being" to include a fetus, even for this lim-
ited purpose. He suggested that the legislature should not attempt this
defining piecemeal, but should instead appoint a select committee to
study the problem and devise a legislative definition of human life.
Opposition from all quarters was overcome with typical legislative dex-
terity, and the bill was passed by a bare majority and sent to the sen-
ate.2 7
The next crisis for the bill was in the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary. Senator George Moscone (D-San Francisco) objected to'in-
clusion of the exception for abortions performed under the Thera-
peutic Abortion Act.28 He felt that since the definition of murder in-
cludes only "unlawful" killings, and an abortion performed under the
Therapeutic Abortion Act is not unlawful, the courts might construe
the law proposed by Biddle as creating some new exception to its
terms. Why should the legislature make an exception for something
already excepted? He opposed the bill as then constituted on this
ground. Senator Anthony Beilenson (D-Los Angeles) accused Biddle
of overreacting to a situation needing careful consideration. He pro-
23 Hearings on A.B. 816 before the California Assembly Criminal Procedure
Committee, July 15, 1970.24 Debate on A.B. 816 in the California Assembly, July 17, 1970.
25 Hearings on A.B. 816 before the California Assembly Criminal Procedure
Committee, July 22, 1970.
26 A.B. 816, 1970 Regular Session, as amended July 17, 1970.
27 Debate on A.B. 816 in the California Assembly, July 27, 1970.
28 A.B. 816, 1970 Regular Session, as amended July 17, 1970.
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posed that a study of the problem be undertaken, citing Biddle to the
abortion laws, and arguing that if we consider a fetus expendable by
abortion, we cannot properly consider it a life for purposes of murder.
I-le also argued that the bill should not include a fetus at the moment
of conception, but at the moment of viability, defined as that point in
time where the fetus could live separate from its mother.
Neither Moscone nor Beilenson was successful in opposition to the
bill, but Senator Clark Bradley (R-San Jose) and Senator George
Deukmejian (R-Los Angeles) prevailed upon Biddle to make what
they considered important changes. Bradley, showing his considerable
influence on the committee, insisted that the bill not change the law
regarding manslaughter. "' Along with Senator Nicholas C. Petris (D-
Alameda) the acting committee chairman, Bradley felt that the key
reason for making a fetus the subject of murder was the defendant's
extreme culpability, and since that same level of purpose was not in-
volved with manslaughter, the change should not apply to it. Deuk-
mejian suggested that if the bill were amended to read only that a
fetus could be the subject of murder, not that a fetus was a human being
for purposes of the statute, those who objected to the bill on its defini-
tional basis would be mollified.
Assemblyman Biddle, anxious to have his bill approved, prepared
the suggested amendments and submitted them for adoption on the
senate floor. He also amended the bill to delete the language which
provided that the hew statute would not apply to any abortion which
was "necessary to preserve the life of the mother." This language
which had been held to be so vague as to be unconstitutional was
replaced with Biddle's version of the language approved by the su-
preme court in the Belous case." Biddle had left the original lan-
guage in the bill thinking that as long as it was in an exception to
application of the statute, its constitutionality was not an issue, but
further reflection had convinced him the new language was better.
When the bill was returned to committee, it was in its final form and
was sent back to the senate floor with a "do pass" recommendation.
With some last minute legislative finagling, Assembly Bill 816 was
passed by both houses of the legislature and signed by the Governor on
September 17, 1970.
Though it had been altered considerably, the bill was still satis-
29 A.B. 816, as amended July 17, 1970, applied to both murder and manslaughter.
30 71 A.C. 996, 1013, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357-58 (1969). A.B. 816. as amended
August 7, 1970, paraphrases the language used by the Belous court.
3 1 Hearings on A.B. 816 before the California Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, August 12, 1970.
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factory to its author. Biddle was convinced that it would accomplish
his original intent, that is, to make Robert Keeler's actions susceptible
to a charge of murder.32 As amended, Penal Code section 187, the
only section finally affected by the bill, reads as follows:
187. (a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or
a fetus, with malice aforethought. (b) This section shall not apply
to any person who commits an act which results in the death of a
fetus if any of the following apply:
(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion Act,
Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 25950) of Division 20 of
the Health and Safety Code.
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's and
surgeon's certificate, as defined in the Business and Professions
Code, in a case where, to a medical certainty, the result of child-
birth would be death of the mother of the fetus, or where her death
from childbirth, although not medically certain, would be sub-
stantially certain or more likely than not.
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted or consented to by
the mother of the fetus. (c) Subdivision (b) shall not be con-
strued to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other
provision of law.-"
Background
Before assessing the effect of the new law, we should look to its
background to determine the need for such legislation. Penal Code
section 187 was enacted in 1872 as part of a general revision of the
California statutes.3 4 It was adopted, with little change, from the Pe-
nal Code of 1850 whch was enacted by the state's first legislature.35
Murder was the "unlawful killing of a human being, with malice afore-
thought." The provisions as to express and implied malice were simply
placed in a subsequent code section in 1872.36
Also enacted in 1872 was Penal Code section 5, which declared
that the revisions of statutes should not be considered new laws, but
as continuations of old laws, at least to the extent no change had been
made.3 7 This was-the last revision of Penal Code section 187.
The California Supreme Court in the Keeler case specifically found
32 Press Release from the Office of Assembly Majority Leader W. Craig Biddle,
June 15, 1970.
33 A.B. 816, 1970 Regular Session.
34 CAL. PEN. CODE OF 1872.
35 CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, § 19, p. 231.
• G CAL. PEN. CODE OF 1872, § 188. See also CAL. STATs. 1850, c. 99, §§ 20, 21,
p. 231.
3T CAL. PEN. CODE OF 1872, § 5.
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that the California Legislature, in enacting the 1850 and 1872 versions
of the statute, did not intend that a fetus should be included within the
definition of a human being. 8 To reach this conclusion, the court
first reviewed the common law authority from which the legislature is
presumed to have drawn its intent in enacting the original laws. '0
Their holding that, "by the year 1850 . . . an infant could not be
the subject of homicide at common law unless it had been born alive"
(emphasis is the court's) is amply supported in both English and
American case law, and need not be the subject of extensive dis-
cussion here.40 Coke, Blackstone and others stated the early English
law and a collection of cases, both English and American, support the
position in each country after the systems diverged.41  The rule was
based on the common law presumption that a child was born dead.
The presumption seems to have arisen from the high natal death rate
before modern antisepsis became prevalent, and the state of early
delivery procedures in general.42  Thus in each case where murder
or manslaughter was charged and the victim was a fetus or an infant,
proof of birth alive had to be adduced to sustain a conviction.
43
Once the court determined that this was the law in 1850, they then
had to examine the intent with which California legislators enacted
their first penal law. The sources from which they could draw their
conclusions were limited. They determined that the early legislature
had indeed looked to the existing common law, and related the support
for that conclusion in their opinion.44
Other sources support this conclusion also. Hubert Howe Ban-
croft, a noted California historian, observed that in 1847 the area was
rapidly becoming Americanized. There was much discontent with the
Alcalde system, where appointed governors administered the jumble
of laws under which the populace was expected to live. 4" Two
San Francisco weekly newspapers were clamoring for a constitutional
convention,"4 and when that convention was finally held in 1850, the
often-absent legislators engaged in a "good. deal of 'slavish copying' of
the Constitutions of New York and Iowa."47
38 2 Cal. 3d 619, 628 (1970).
39 Id. at 625.
40 Id. at 625.
41 2 Cal. 3d 619, 625-630 (1970).
42 See discussion of this presumption in an article by Stanley D. Atkinson, Life,
Birth, and Live-Birth, 20 LAw QUARTERLY REVIEW 134 (1904). It is also raised by the
Court in People v. Belous, 71 A.C. 996, 1007, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (1969).
43 2 Cal. 3d 619, 626 (1970).
44 2 Cal. 3d 619, 629-630 (1970).
45 6 H. BANcROFr, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 261 (1888).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 296.
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The State was thus born in the spirit of the common law. Most of
the legislators were from the East, and while some concessions were
made to the Spanish law under which the area had existed, the familiar
common law was emphasized.4 8
One of the first acts adopted by the legislature was one providing
that the common law of England was the "rule of decision" in the
California courts.49 The murder statute adopted was not the only one
relating to homicide. An abortion statute comprehensive for its day
was enacted also.5° And in keeping with the English tradition, the
legislature enacted a statute punishing concealment of a bastard child.8 '
There is little doubt then that the early legislature did not intend to
include a fetus within the definition of a human being for purposes of
murder. And the 1872 revisers of the Penal Code gave no indication
that their intent had changed in this regard.52 Since that time little
has occurred which could have been of help to the court in interpreting
Penal Code section 187. It was established early that any informa-
tion brought pursuant to section 187 had to state that a "human be-
ing' had been murdered,53 and that "human being" may be inferred
from the wording of the document. 54 But the first case which ap-
proached the problem was People v. Eldridge.55 This case again
involved an allegedly insufficient information. The defendant claimed
that alleging only that the child was born and that defendant killed it
does not mean the child was born alive. The court rejected this con-
tention by saying the fact that it could be killed indicated it was born
alive."8 The court did not reach the question of whether or not the
child actually needed to be born alive in order to be the subject of
murder, but by implication this could be considered the holding of the
case.
Forty years later the court finally discussed this problem in the case
of People v. Chavez.17 Josephine Chavez had expelled her baby into
the family toilet in the dead of night. The baby lay there unattended
48 CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATURE, prepared by the Office of the Chief Clerk of the
California Assembly in 1969, indicates at p. 46 that all but two of the original 52
were non-natives. They enacted one section stating their desire to adhere to the
common law (CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 95, p. 219), but also enacted a section creating the
office of State Translator, whose job was to translate laws and documents into
Spanish. CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 8, p. 51.
49 CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 95, p. 219.
50 CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, § 45, p. 233.
51 CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, § 38, p. 233.
52 Code Commissioners' Notes, CAL. PENAL CODE OF 1872.
53 People v. Lee Look, 137 Cal. 590, 591 (1902).
54 People v. Smith, 215 Cal. 749, 751 (1932).
55 3 Cal. App. 648 (1906).
56 Id. at 649.
57 77 Cal. App. 2d 621 (1947).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 2
until she removed it and placed it under the tub, where it was found
dead by Josephine's mother the following day. s  Josephine was
charged with manslaughter. Her attorney alleged on appeal that the
evidence did not show live birth, and that this was necessary to sus-
tain the conviction. 59 The court affirmed the lower court's decision
largely on its findings of fact, saying that the evidence was sufficient
to "support the implied finding of the jury that this child was born
alive and became a human being within the meaning of the homicide
statutes."60  Appellant had testified that the baby was "limp and made
no cry,"6' and the autopsy surgeon was convinced that evidence of
heart action and inflation of the lungs indicated live birth. 2 While
the defense offered an expert who brought the autopsy surgeon's tests
for live birth into question, it merely presented a question for the jury.
which was resolved against the defendant. 63
In his opinion in Chavez, however, the appellate judge considered
the question of whether or not a complete separation of infant from
mother need be proven to sustain the idea of live birth. This was
necessary because respondent contended that the heart action and lung
inflation relied on by the doctor could have occurred while the head of
the infant was out of its mother, but before the rest of him was ex-
pelled. 64  The court said in rejecting the contention that, "it should at
least be held that it is a human being where it is a living baby and
where in the natural course of events a birth which is already started
would naturally be successfully completed."0' 5 Chavez, then, is not
definitive authority on the live birth issue. The holding obliquely pre-
saged the Keeler finding, but left the later supreme court free to
decide the issue without benefit of precedent in California.
The Keeler court adopted the early version of legislative intent
though they were by no means mandated to do so. California author-
ity on legislative intent is sparse and less than persuasive.66 As sug-
gested in Justice Burke's dissenting opinion in Keeler, a different ver-
sion may well have been appropriate. 17 But it is well to note with
regard to changing intent that where the legislative intent did in fact
58 Id. at 623.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 627.
61 Id. at 623.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 627.
64 Id. at 624.
65 Id. at 626.
66 Hearings on Legislative Intent before the California Assembly Subcomnittee
on Legislative Intent of the Assembly Interim Committee on Rules, Nov. 29 and Dec.
6, 1962, p. 3.
67 2 Cal. 3d 619, 641 (1970).
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change, so did the law. We have new abortion laws now, showing a
clear intent on the part of the legislature to change the prior law.68
Intent need not be inflexible through the years. It may change
with changing social conditions, as those who have had to interpret the
United States Constitution have found. When the reason for the rule
ceases to exist, then the rule itself may be inapplicable. At any rate,
regardless of the legislature's or the court's feelings on the subject,
Assemblyman Biddle had to deal with reality. The law had been in-
terpreted so as to cover the situation inadequately, and Biddle sought
change.
Other Statutes
The most obvious sources for direction as to how to frame a new
statute are the California statutes and case law on related subjects.
The abortion laws, for instance, provided a good basis for Biddle to
look for the ways in which the law treated a fetus, especially since
Biddle was the author of the Therapeutic Abortion Act,69 California's
most recent abortion law. It allows abortion of a fetus at or prior to
20 weeks in development.70 Though the act itself contains no refer-
ence to the stage at which a fetus becomes a human life, Assemblyman
Biddle maintains that this was one of his intentions in prescribing the
20-weeks requirement, and was disappointed when forced to remove it
from his bill.7
Another possible source of evidence is the Civil Code. Section 29
provides that an unborn child is to be deemed an existing person for
purposes of protecting his interests in the event of subsequent birth.72
As interpreted in Scott v. MacPheeters,73 this section allows a suit
on behalf of a minor child for injuries suffered before birth. The
right of action is of course dependent upon live birth of the infant,
so neither the code section nor the case provides definitive guidance.
For purposes of inheritance or succession, a posthumous child is
deemed existing at the time of the parent's death. Again, however,
this requires live birth of the child.74
The Penal Code also provides for protection of an unborn infant.
68 The Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, commencing
with § 25950, was enacted in 1967. It is the modem expression of legislative intent
in that field.
09 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, commencing with § 25950.
70 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, § 25953.
71 Press Release from the office of Assembly Majority Floor Leader W. Craig
Biddle, Room 2128, State Capitol, Sacramento, California, June 15, 1970.
72 CAL. CIV. CODE § 29.
73 33 Cal. App. 2d 629 (1939).
74 CAL. PROB. CODE § 250.
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The code provides for postponing until birth the execution of a preg-
nant female sentenced to death. 7  These sections, perhaps, most
closely parallel the case of murder of a fetus. The existence of the
child is specifically recognized, and what is more important, he is con-
sidered a life worth saving. But in such a case, the state is simply
postponing an execution of a previously convicted murderer. The
criminal is not made to suffer, and is not in danger of having a pro-
tectible interest threatened. In the case of convicting a man of murder
of a fetus, the relative interests are considerably different. Holding that
the unborn infant's life is subject to the crime of murder means that
a man may be convicted of that murder.
We thus find little of value in other California code sections. The
statutes for the most part require live birth of the infant before his
interests are protected, and where birth is not necessary, the interest
which may be weighed against that of holding the infant's life protecti-
ble is not sufficient to require the most complete protection possible.
Other Jurisdictions
The law of other jurisdictions is also of some interest when at-
tempting to formulate a penal statute. Although the murder and abor-
tion statutes in many states have existed as long as California's, and
provide substantially the same, some have been recently updated. New
York, for instance, thoroughly revised and updated its entire Penal
Law in 1967, attempting at the time to bring it securely into the modem
world. 70  Although the New York code revisers recognized that their
law was outmoded and irrelevant to the problems of modem society,
thley were reluctant to change the common law to the extent Assembly
Bill 816 proposed. They preferred to protect only the fetus of 24 weeks
development or more, deriving the 24 weeks from the modern version
of the common law concept of quickening. 77 Fortunately, however,
they saw the need for'such a law to be consistent in application, and
made the limit apply to each of the crimes of murder, manslaughter of
all degrees, criminally negligent homicide, abortion of first degree and
self-abortion of the first degree.78 The reason for retaining the 24
weeks limit is somewhat obscure, but it is stated at one point in a
practice commentary to the code that it is because beyond this point,
any kind of abortion is much more dangerous to the life of the mother.79
75 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 3705, 3706.76 N.Y. PENAL LAW commencing with § 125.00 (McKinney 1967).
77 Id., § 125.00 and Practice Commentary thereto.
78 Id.
"9 Id., § 125.20, and Practice Commentary thereto.
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The Wisconsin scheme is to define a human being as one who has
been born alive, and make this definition apply to murder and man-
slaughter."0 This code revision was accomplished in 1955, and indi-
cates that not all modem legislatures desire to make a fetus the sub-
ject of murder."' The abortion statute, also revised in 1955, pro-
vides for various punishments for both a mother who aborts her child
and the aborter himself.82
Thus, the statutes extant in the United States do not lend much
support to the idea that a fetus should be considered a human being
for purposes of murder. Where modem statutes have been adopted,
the support would seem to be for a compromise between Assembly Bill
816 and the present status of the law. It seems easier for men to be-
lieve that a child which is "quick" or "viable" is protectible, than to
believe that an embryonic fetus is.
A.B. 816 Reviewed
California's new law is somewhat of an anomaly. It appears to
adopt the doctrinaire position of the Catholic Church on human life,
i.e., that it begins at conception.8 3 But of course it deals only with mur-
der, and practically speaking, in such a case as Robert Keeler's, the
mitigation of murder to manslaughter may well operate to reduce
such a charge to the level of assault, rendering the murder statute in-
applicable, since the accused would not be triable for manslaughter.
The new statute's lack of application to the crime of manslaughter
is an interesting bent in the law. New York's law applies to all crimes
involving killing of a fetus.8 5 But the California Legislature saw fit
in Assembly Bill 816 to exclude the lesser crimes, presumably because
in those cases defendant's culpability is less. 86  This may have been
due to lack of understanding of the homicide law's operation, or a
deliberate attempt to limit the effect of the law. But regardless of the
reason, the exception appears to have removed whatever teeth A.B. 816
may have had in its original form.
The first of the three exceptions to the new statute's operation is for
80 Wisc. CRmINAL CODE § 939.22(16).
81 Wisc. LAWS 1955, c. 696, § 1.
82, WIsC. CRIMMnAL CODE § 940.04.
83 See the discussion of this concept in Means, The Law of New York Concerning
Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitu-
tionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 413-415 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Means].
84 California's present murder statute contains the common law concept of
"malice aforethought." This malice can be mitigated by the murder having been
committed in a "heat of passion." Manslaughter would then be the proper charge.
85 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1967).
86 See p. 174 supra.
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the Therapeutic Abortion Act.8 7 Though this exception probably was
not necessary, since killings performed under its aegis are not "unlaw-
ful," it does have the effect of balancing the new section by including all
exceptions thereto. The Act becomes important when an abortion is
performed which does not meet its conditions.88 Then the prosecutor
could go to section 274 of the Penal Code for his conviction. 9 The
specific abortion statute would be applied rather than the murder
statute.
The second exception to the statute's operation is derived from lan-
guage in People v. Belous.9  In that case, the supreme court in-
validated a conviction under Penal Code section 274, as worded in
1967. The court declared that the words "necessary to preserve the
life of the mother" did not give a physician sufficient guidance to
insure that he would have due process of law in following the statute. 1
Biddle's original version of Assembly Bill 816 contained this precise
language, and while it was momentarily thought that its being in an
exception to the rule would render the constitutional question insignifi-
cant, a change was recommended. 92  The language in the bill as passed
was prepared by the Legislative Counsel, and comes directly from the
Belous opinion.9" The language appears to give a physician some
guidance for purposes of, for instance, inducing abortion in a woman
more than 20 weeks pregnant where her life is in danger. It has the
added advantage of having been uttered by the state's highest court
in seeming approval.
The third exception simply allows for operation of Penal Code sec-
tion 276, providing for punishment of a pregnant woman who solicits
an abortion outside the terms of the Therapeutic Abortion Act. 94  Al-
though this section was the butt of considerable opposition from solici-
tous legislators, 95 it appears reasonable to assume that where a situa-
tion is specifically provided for in one statute carrying a lesser pen-
alty, the same acts should not be made punishable under a harsher
statute without changing the former.
87 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, commencing with § 25950.
88 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 25951 provides that abortions may be
committed under the Act if (1) there is substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother, or
(2) the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. Section 25953 provides that the
abortion may not be committed if the pregnancy is beyond 20 weeks.
89 CAL. PEN. CODE § 274. It provides that "Every person who .. .uses or
employs any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the
miscarriage of such woman. . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.90 71 A.C. 996, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
91 Id. at 1002.
92 A.B. 816, 1970 Regular Session, as amended June 24, 1970.
93 Section (b) (2) of the new CAL. PEN. CODE, § 187.
94 CAL. PEN. CODE § 276.
95 See p. 173 supra.
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The new law will obviously be limited in its application. The
dearth of California case law on the subject is a good indication of
this. It appears to be another one of those areas where more com-
prehensive legislation is needed, but the exigencies of the situation
demand at least a beginning of consideration of the subject.
What is Life?
The California Legislature neatly avoided having to define human
life for purposes of the new murder statute, though such a course was
suggested. a6 Perhaps it would have been presumptuous of them to
undertake definition of a concept so evanescent as to have eluded the
grasp of metaphysicians for centuries.
Different societies have adopted vastly different views of the na-
ture of human life and the point at which it begins and is legally pro-
tectible. The ancient Greeks formulated a theory that the soul en-
tered the male fetus at 40 days of uterogestation, and the female fetus
at 80 days, though there was little basis for the time period or the dis-
tinction between male and female . 7 But this early investiture of the
fetus with a soul did not operate to protect the child after birth.
The Greeks disposed of deformed or deficient children.98
The Catholic Church theorizes that the soul enters the fetus at con-
ception, and derives its legal concepts of protection of the fetus from
this philosophy. Where there is a soul, there is a life, and where
there is a life, it can be taken only by God.9 If man presumes to
take that life he must be punished, and since qualitatively, at least
from the standpoint of presence of a soul, there is no difference be-
tween an adult human, a newborn infant and a fetus at any stage of
gestation, the crime the man commits in each case is murder. There is
little point in decrying such a concept with statements to the effect
that medically a fetus doesn't become differentiated until a certain
point in gestation is reached, or that it is not considered a proper fetus
until such a point is reached. 100 This is within the ken of all people,
and presumably has been considered and rejected by Catholics as not
dispositive. The presence of soul to them denotes human life.
Other authorities have found life to be present at quickening, or at
96 See pp. 173, 174 supra.
97 NORMAN ST. JoHN-STEvAS, THE RIGHT To LnE, c. 2 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as ST. JOHN-STEVAS].
98 PLATO, REPUBLIC, c, V, § IX. Plato, while not normally used as a source
material, reflects the Greece of his day.
99 ST. JoHN-STEvAs, at 61.
100 5 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED
SPECIALTIES 37.1, 37.2.
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the time when the first movements of the infant are felt by the mother. 10 1
Thus, at this point in gestation, usually around 20-24 weeks, the infant
is said to be capable of being the subject of murder. Perhaps such a
theory has more value when one considers that those advocating the
doctrine are looking at a point somewhere in between what they con-
sider too early (conception) and one they feel is too late (birth).
They have compromised at a recognizable point, and one which was
easily discernible to the physician of old. Though this concept is
somewhat downgraded today because our knowledge has taught us
that the infant may be no more likely to survive at this point than at
some earlier point, the concept may be of some value.
The Jewish concept of life has been that it begins at birth.0 2 The
Jews traditionally have placed much more emphasis on the business of
living, not celebrating the afterlife as do other religions. The infant is
not endowed with life until birth, and so could not be murdered until
that time. This view of life is consistent with the Wisconsin statute
relating to murder.0 3
The concept implied by California's new murder statute is that for
purposes of murder, human life begins at conception. Apart from
the practical difficulties of determining when conception takes place,
there is the question of whether the statute should take this position.
It is argued that if we can take the "life" of a fetus up to 20 weeks
old under the abortion statute, this same fetus cannot be considered a
protectible human life for purposes of murder. We do not allow
euthanasia, even though the prospective victim makes the choice and
even the request himself.'04 If his life is taken it is murder. Shall
we put a human fetus in this same special class for one purpose,
when we exclude it for purposes of abortion? We have recognized a
separate category for the fetus by allowing a pregnant woman to solicit
abortion of her infant without punishment for murder.10 Shall we
allow another man's life to be taken for taking that same life?
Another argument against a concept which holds that life begins at
conception is that medically a fetus is not considered more than an
embryo until 20 weeks of development have taken place. 00 Prior to
this point, the fetus is for the most part not x-rayable, 10 7 nor does it
101 ST. Jom4-STEvAs at c. 2. See also Jeffrey A. Meldman, Legal Concepts of
Human Life: The Infanticide Doctrines, 52 MARQ. L. Rnv. 105 (1968).
102 Means at 412.
103 See p. 181 supra.
104 People v. Dessauer, 38 C.2d 547 (1952). See also Repouille v. United
States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
105 CAL. PEN. CODE § 276.
106 5 LAwYERs' MED. Cyc. 37.2.
107 Id.
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have much chance of survival.' 08 Moreover, not until 6-10 days after
fertilization does the ovum become distinguishable as an embryo. 10 9 As
did Robert Keeler, men are more inclined to consider a fetus as "it",
rather than "he" or "she". A being so alien to what we know to be
human beings seems hardly worth being made the subject of murder,
regardless of the religious conception of life.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has enacted a bill the purpose of which was
to define their intent on this very issue. Ostensibly, that intent is so
defined. However, as noted earlier, the bill never received whole-
hearted support. Its inapplicability to manslaughter leaves the law
bare in an area where cases would appear to be much more likely to
arise, indicating that their intent was not so clear as purported to be.
Perhaps the answer is to form a committee to study the matter with
regard to all situations where it could possibly make a difference, as
has been suggested by members of the legislature.
Borden D. Webb
108 Id.
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